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RECENT CASE NOTES
session under the contract. Plaintiff brings this action in ejectment. Held:
Judgment for defendants. Baker et ux. v. Eades, Appellate Court of
Indiana, January 29, 1930, 169 N. E. 686.
The court said that the plaintiff waived the condition requiring payments to be made in advance each month, and waived the condition making
time of the essence of the contract. The provision of payment each and
every month constituted an express promissory condition precedent. That
is, it was a condition expressed in the contract, containing a promise of
the defendant to perform the condition, and it was precedent to performance by the plaintiff. Since it was a promissory condition, it gave a right
to the plaintiff-a right to compel the defendant to pay according to his
promise. A right cannot be waived. 35 Yale Law Journal, 970; Ewart,
Waiver Distributed. Therefore the plaintiff did not waive this condition.
The plaintiff, by accepting payments irregularly, represented to the defendant that he would not demand strict performance of the promissory
condition to pay. Inferring that the defendant relied upon this representation, we have a case of estoppel. One can be estopped from asserting a
right, although he cannot waive it. Ewart, Waiver Distributed. Therefore, should not the court have said that the plaintiff is estopped from
setting up the breach of the condition, rather than that he waived it? The
provision as to time being of the essence of the contract is an express condition precedent. Whether it is promissory or casual is difficult to determine. It would seem to be promissory, and if it is, then the above reasoning will apply and estoppel instead of waiver would be found in the same
way. However, if it is a casual condition-that is, it does not include a
promise and the defendant would not be liable in damages for its breachit will not be necessary to go so far. A casual condition would give only
a privilege to the plaintiff. A privilege can be waived. A common example
of this where A makes an offer to B. B has the privilege of accepting,
and if he rejects the offer he waives his privilege of acceptance. There.
fore a casual condition precedent may be waived. Now that the conditions
of payments every month and of time being of the essence of the contract
are rendered nugatory in effect by estoppel, we really have a new contract
to sell between the parties in which the defendant has a reasonable time
to pay. Since the plaintiff did not give the defendant a reasonable time
to perform, and since the law looks with disfavor on forfeiture, the result
of the case is clearly right.
J. A. B.
WAREHOUSEMEN-DuTY To USE ORDINARY CARE-RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENE-The appellants, carriers and warehousemen, contracted with appellee to store his household goods and later transport them to Chicago.
Goods were placed in appellants' Indianapolis warehouse where they were
destroyed by an accidental fire. The warehouse was a wooden structure,
and appellee's goods were piled at one end of the building, together with
other goods stored there, and were held in place by wooden supports. There
was no protection between the center of the building, where appellants kept
their trucks, and the household goods. After the fire an electric light drop
was found hanging close to the open gasoline tank of one of these trucks.
Appellee alleged that appellant was negligent in placing the goods in such
a highly inflammable structure which they should have known was not
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properly or reasonably constructed to resist fire. Verdict for $1,400 for
appellee and judgment thereon. Held: Affirmed. P. & A. Dispatch, Inc.,
et al. v. MacDougall, Appellate Court of Indiana, in Banc. March 14, 1930.
It has long been settled that a warehousman is not liable as an insurer
of the goods, Rice v. Nixon, 97 Ind. 97; he is not liable for loss due to an
act of God, or of the public enemy, or because of inherent defects in the
goods, or for other causes resulting from no negligence on his part. If,
however, a fire has been caused by his negligence, or the goods were
exposed to danger of fire without proper protection, the warehouseman is
liable. Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington,119 S. W. 249; Merchants, etc.,
Assn. v. Livingston, 3 So. 251. A warehouseman must exercise ordinary
care commensurate with the value of the goods stored and the circumstances
to protect the property from injury from within or without. England v.
Lyon, etc., Co., 271 P. 532; Air Line Co. v. McCool, 26 Ind. 140. The duty
of a bailee requires him to forsee every danger which a person of ordinary
care would have foreseen under the circumstances, including the danger of
fire, and to use such care in guarding against the danger as a person of
ordinary prudence would have used. Failing in this duty he is liable even
though the fire occurred without fault on his part. Belt R. Co. v. McClain,
58 Ind. App. 171, 106 N. E. 742. A fire-proof building is not required
but a safe one is, C. & A. R. R. v. Scott, 42 Ill. 132, so that precautions
taken by the warehouseman "for the prevention of fire and for its extinguishment" are elements proper to be considered in determining whether
he was negligent. Dieterle v. Bekin, 77 P. 664.
The Gulf Compress Co. case, supra, held a bailee negligent for not
closing racks in the walls of his warehouse, through which sparks from an
adjacent railroad could enter and set fire to cotton stored inside; and in
Williamson v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 217 S. W. 614, it was left to the
jury whether a warehouseman was negligent for failing to produce the
keys to locks quickly enough, thereby causing a delay while the locks were
broken open and the goods only partly saved. The degree of care required
depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, Line v. Mills, 12
Ind. 100, and the evidence in the present case undoubtedly supported the
verdict that the appellants had not provided a suitable warehouse.
J.W.S.

